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 1.  Introduction 
This article analyzes the effect of free public education on fertility, private educational 
investments and human capital accumulation at different stages of economic 
development. It uses a growth model with endogenous fertility to show that parental 
human capital levels are crucial for implications of free education. At early stages of 
develpment, if parental human capital levels are low, free access to basic education may 
provide the only chance to leave poverty. In contrast, at advanced stages of development, 
if parental human capital is high, the availability of free public education crowds out 
private educational investments, increases fertility and may be detrimantal for growth. 
The analysis suggests that, once the necessarily high level of society's human capital is 
achieved, an appropriate public education policy should substitute away from free public 
education regime and concentrate on improvements in the productivity of private 
educational investments. 
This formulation also contributes to better understanding of the effect of different 
educational regimes (free public education vs. private education) on income inequality 
across different groups within society at different levels of the society's development.  
This paper is chiefly related to the following strands in the literature: (1) formal 
schooling and human capital formation and (2) endogenous fertility and growth. The 
influence of formal schooling on long run human capital accumulation and the evolution 
of income inequality has recently received considerable attention. The growing body of 
the literature, such as, e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar (1992; 1995; 2000; 2001; 2003), 
Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), Barham et al. (1995), Glomm 
(1997), Kaganivich and Zilcha (1999), Bearse et al. (2000), Viaene and Zilcha (2002a, 
2002b, 2005), Zilcha (2003), among others, has studied the effect of free public education 
and compared it to the other kinds of education, such as private education and mixed 
educational regime. One of the major conclusions of the existing literature in this context 
is that public education stimulates human capital accumulation and enhances equality.
1 
All the aforementioned studies analyzed the issue under assumption of no population 
                                                  
1 For the positive effect of public education on equality see, e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar (1992; 2001), 
Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), Barham et al. (1995), Glomm (1997), Viaene   2
growth, so that one parent gives birth to one child. The major contribution of the present 
study to this strand of the literature is to add endogenous fertility and to show that, due to 
the interactions with parental fertility decisions, at different stages of economic 
development, free education may affect human capital accumulation and, hence, 
economic growth, differently. At early stages of development, when parental human 
capital levels are low, fertility dimension is, indeed, less important. The growth model 
with endogenous fertility used in this paper mostly replicates the results of the previous 
literature concerning the effect of free public education on human capital accumulation 
and inequality between the rich and the poor. In contrast, at advanced stages of 
development, when parental human capital levels are high, if fertility is endogenized, the 
effect of free public education may be different. Even in the absence of a negative effect 
of taxation on the incentives to invest in human capital,
2 the availability of free education 
crowds out private educational investments, increases fertility,
3 negatively affects equality 
within the group of the offspring of skilled parents and may be detrimental for growth. 
This result is the opposite to the finding of the studies that neglect fertility. 
  This paper is also related to the literature on endogenous fertility and growth. The 
growth literature with endogenous fertility has evolved through three phases. Initially, 
researchers developed models in which interactions between fertility and growth is 
consistent with the negative relationship observed in cross-county growth regressions, as 
in Becker and Barro (1988), Barro and Becker (1989), and Becker et al. (1990).
4 
Subsequently, the focus switched toward models that discuss demographic transition and 
offer diverse explanations (e.g., Galor and Weil, 1996; Dahan and Tsiddon, 1998; 
Morand, 1999). Later on, researchers have focused on the long-term transition from 
stagnation to growth (e.g., Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav 2002; 2004). Most 
                                                                                                                                                   
and Zilcha (2005). Cf., however, Glomm and Ravikumar (2003) who argued that public education may 
initially increase inequality in the short run. 
2 With this respect, Banerjee (2004) argued that a proportional tax on human capital reduces human capital 
investment even if it is then redistributed as a lamp-sum educational subsidy. Orazem and Tesfatsion (1997) 
discuss the disincentive effect of income redistribution on children's schooling effort. The negative effect of 
taxation and income redistribution for the incentive to invest in human capital is shown also in Azarnert 
(2004). 
3 The current formulation abstracts from the argument that at advanced levels of development free school 
system may also directly reduce the cost of child-care for parents, as has been argued, e.g., by Schultz 
(1969).   3
recently, Azarnert (2004) introduced an analysis of interactions between income 
redistribution, fertility and growth in an economy that operates in an open world.
5 All 
these studies abstracted from public education provided for free by governments and 
analyzed the issue under assumption that human capital is acquired under the private 
education regime. The present study contributes to the aforementioned literature by 
analyzing the interaction between free public education and fertility decisions – the 
dimension that this strand of the literature has yet to integrate.
6 
 
 2.  The Basic Structure of the Model 
 
Consider a small, open, overlapping-generations economy, in which activity extends over 
infinite discrete time. In every period, the economy produces a single homogenous good 
in a constant-returns-to-scale technology using human capital as a single input. In each 
generation, agents live for two periods – childhood and adulthood. In childhood, 
individuals acquire human capital. In adulthood, they work, become parents and bring up 
their offspring. As parents, adult individuals must allocate a positive fraction of their time 
to feeding and raising their children and may also invest in private education of their 
children in addition to free public education. 
 
 2.1.   Human Capital Production 
 
An adult in period t is characterized by a skill level ht distributed according to the 
cumulative density function Ft ) (⋅  over the strictly positive support  ].   , [
max min
t t h h  In each 
period of life, individuals are endowed with one unit of time. In the first period, children 
devote their entire time for the acquisition of human capital. The acquired human capital 
increases if their time investment is supplemented with real resources invested in their 
education in public and private school. Public school provides a certain level of education, 
equal for all children, at zero cost for their parents. To simplify the analysis, this kind of 
                                                                                                                                                   
4 Cf. also Beauchemin (2001) who has demonstrated in a political-economic equilibrium that sufficiently 
high exogenous population growth can trigger economic stagnation.  
5 See also, e.g., Galor and Moav (2001) and Galor (2005) for references. 
6 An exception is Moav (2005), who recently noted that free schooling provided by the government may 
generate a reallocation of parental resources from child quality toward quantity.   4
schooling is assumed to be financed by a non-distortive tax.
7 In addition to public 
schooling that is exogenous for families, parents may decide to commit some fraction of 
their resources to private education of their children, so as to increase their human capital 
stock. However, even in the absence of real expenditure individuals acquire some basic 
skills. The human capital level of a child, who becomes an adult in period  , 1 + t  depends 
on the level of free public schooling,  , µ  the parental real expenditure on the child’s 
private education,  , t e  and on the average level of human capital of all adult individuals in 
period t, defined as  , ) ( ∫ = h dF h h t t t  according to the human capital production function 
or learning technology described by
8 
       ). ( ) , ( ) , , ( 1 t t t t t h e h e h Φ Ψ = Θ = + µ µ                                                                             (1) 
  Along with the two direct sources of human capital – public and private 
educational inputs – this learning technology captures an external effect that arises from 
the average society’s level of human capital,  . t h  Such formulation is consistent with the 
so-called global or atmospheric externality (e.g., Dasgupta, 1993), that has been recently 
utilized, e.g., by Benabou (1996), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Vidal (1998), Morand 
(1999), Viaene and Zilcha (2002a; 2002b; 2005), among others.
9  In this particular 
context, this assumption may reflect the fact that, in general, in a more advanced society 
teachers are more skilled and that the more skilled teachers are more effective in 
delivering knowledge. In addition, it is also commonly assumed in this literature that in 
each generation teachers in public schools are chosen randomly from the population of 
that generation. 
The learning technology is required to satisfy the following set of assumptions, 
which specify how various inputs affects the human capital level of a child. 
                                                  
7 Such formulation allows us abstract from the negative effect of taxation on private human capital 
investments.. 
8 An alternative formulation, in which the efficiency of private educational investments directly depends on 
parental human capital level, yields the same results of optimization. 
9 The external effect of social environment in the formation of human capital has also long been stressed in 
sociology (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Wilson, 1987). Cf. also, e.g., references in Benabou (1996).   5
 
The properties of the production function of human capital practically imply that: 
 -  The child’s level of human capital is an increasing function of the level of public 
schooling, of the level of private investment in the child’s education and of the society’s 
average level of human capital  ). 3   2,   1,   , 0 ) , ( i.e., ( j = > ⋅ ⋅ Θ j   
  -  Public and private educational inputs are substitutes and are characterized by 
diminishing returns (i.e.,  ). 2   , 1    , 0 ) , (    and    0 ) , ( 12 = < Ψ < Ψ j e e t jj t µ µ
10 
- Even in the absence of public education, children, whose parents do not invest in their 
education, benefit from the global externality (i.e.,  ). 0 ) (0,0,   , 0 > Θ > ∀ t t h h  
  The subsequent two sections describe the basic optimization problem of parents. 
An analysis of educational system for a particular form of human capital production 
function starts in Section 2.4. 
 
2.2.  The Optimization of Parents 
 
Agents derive utility from their own consumption at adulthood and from the future 
income of their children.
11 The utility function of an individual born at time  1 − t  is 
      ), log( log ) 1 ( 1
N
t t t I C U + + − = β β                                                                                  (2) 
where  t C  is an individual’s own consumption, and 
N
t I 1 +  is the future income of the one’s 
offspring. 
  Adult individuals are endowed with one unit of time, which they allocate between 
child rearing and labor force participation. As a parent, an adult incurs a total cost of 
                                                  
10 The assumption of the perfect substitution between public and private educational inputs has been 
recently stressed, e.g., by Viaene and Zilcha (2002b; 2005). 
11 Parental care about the future income of their offspring can be justified either by the old-age-support 
motive as, e.g., in Morand (1999), or by parental altruism, as, e.g., in Viaene and Zilcha (2002a; 2002b). 
Children's future income also enters parental utility function, e.g., in Galor and Weil (2000); Kalemli-Ozcan 
(2002; 2003); Viaene and Zilcha (2005); Azarnert (2006); cf. also Galor and Moav (2002); Moav (2005). 
.   0 ) , 0 , 0    0   
; 2   , 1   , 0 ) ,    and    0 ) ,   
; 0 ) , , ( D  
able; differenti    twice is      ;   




> ( Θ ≥ ∀
= < ( Ψ < ( Ψ
> Θ




















feeding and raising children, measured in terms of work time foregone, at δ  per child. In 
addition, a parent may invest  t e  units of the wage per efficiency unit of labor,  , w  in each 
child’s private education. 
To maximize their utility function, adult individuals simultaneously choose their 
current consumption,  , t C  the number of children,  , 1 + t N  and the level of educational 
investment in each child,  , t e  subject to the following budget constraint:
12 
      , ) ( 1 t t t t t wh N e h w C ≤ + + + δ                                                                                           (3) 
while the total future income of the one's offspring is: 
       . 1 1 1 w h N I t t
N
t + + + =                            (4) 
The right-hand side of (3) is an adult’s income, which is allocated between consumption 
and the total cost of rearing children whom a parent puts into the world.
13 The wage per 
efficiency unit of labor, w, is fixed over time, as follows, e.g., from the assumption of a 
single production factor in a CRS technology.
14 
 
 2.3.  Quantity / Quality Tradeoff 
An adult makes two simultaneous investment decisions. First, a parent decides how much 
consumption to forego during his adulthood to rear a family. Given a fixed level of 
parental investment in each child’s education  , t e  the marginal cost of an additional child 
is equal to  )]. ( [ t t e h w + δ  To maximize utility, a parent chooses the number of children so 
that the discounted increase in the total children’s income balances the cost. Thus 
investment in quantity, or choice of an optimal number of children,  , 1 + t N  is captured by 
the following first-order condition: 



















N δ                                                                                      (5) 
Second, a parent decides how many resources to invest in the education of his children to 
increase their skill level. For a given number of children, the lost current utility associated 
                                                  
12  The time constraint requires that  . 1 ) ( 1 0 1 ≤ + − ≤ + t t t N h e δ  
13 The model abstracts from child mortality. For the discussion of child mortality in the context of 
educational investments see, e.g., Azarnert (2006) and references therein.   7
with spending an additional unit of won their human capital must be offset by the gain, 
next period, in terms of higher incomes earned by children with superior skills. Thus, for 
a given level of public schooling, private investment in quality, or private investment in 
education, is captured by the first-order condition with respect to choices of et: 



























+ =                                                                                         (6) 
Denoting by Rt(e) the rate of return on investment in human capital (i.e., quality), given a 
fixed number of children, and Rt(N) the rate of return on the number of children (i.e., 
quantity) for a given level of parental investment in education, the first-order conditions 
(5) and (6) are 
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Optimal non-corner solutions for  , 1 + t N  and et must equate the rates of return on quantity 
and quality, Rt(N), and Rt(e). With the two rates of return given above, a non-corner 
solution must therefore be such that 









+ + = δ                                                                                                   (7) 
However, if the rate of return on private educational investment is below the rate of return 
on quantity, a corner solution  ) 0 ( = t e  may exist as well. The next subsection of this 
article discusses the exact solutions to the parents’ optimization problem for a particular 
form of the learning technology and analyzes the effect of the educational system.  
 
2.4.  Public Schooling, Choice of Fertility and Private Investment in Education 
Human capital is assumed to be produced through formal schooling, two components of 
which – public and private – are easily distinguishable. To characterize optimal choices of 
                                                                                                                                                   
14  A small open-economy assumption also yields such result.   8
fertility and private investment in schooling for a given level of free public education, the 
following learning technology is postulated: 
      , 1 0      , 0      , 0      , ) 1 ( 1 < < > ≥ + + = + γ α µ α µ
γ
t t t h e h                                                    (8) 
where µ  measures the level of free public schooling and α  corresponds to the efficiency 
of private human capital investments. 
This particular learning technology captures the major difference between the two 
components of schooling. On one hand, regardless of their parents’ wealth or skill level, 
all children, who attend free public school, acquire the same basic level of human capital. 
On the other hand, additional private education is subject to the family’s choice. 
Given this learning technology, for any  , 0 ≥ µ  the existence of a non-corner 
choice that is solution to (7) implies the necessary condition that 




= > h ht                                                                                                             (9) 
According to this result, there exist two types of parents in the economy. 
 1.  Parents with human capital levels smaller than the threshold  3 ˆ h  who will choose not 
to invest privately in the education of their offspring  ). 0 ( = t e  Therefore, according to (8), 
for any positive level of public schooling  , 0 ≥ µ  their children, when they become adults, 
get 
γ µ) 1 ( +  units of society’s per capita human capital stock: 
      . ) 1 ( 1 t t h h
γ µ + = +                                     (10) 
Since no resources are spent on children’s education, the desired number of children is 
simply the parent’s income after consumption divided by the quantity cost per child: 
       . 1 δ
β
= + t N                                                                                                                   (11) 
 2.  Parents with human capital levels greater than the threshold  3 ˆ h  who will choose to 
invest in private education of their offspring in addition to the basic education provided 
for free in public school. For such parents, the optimal choices of fertility and investment 
in children’s education are as follows: 

















t t h e                                                                                             (12)   9
so that, according to (8), 
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and 















= +                                                                                                         (14) 
Eq. (12) shows that the optimal choice of investment in the offspring’s education and, 
hence, the children’s human capital level (Eq. (13)) is positively related to the parent’s 
human capital level, although parental human capital does not enter the learning 
technology function directly. Eq. (14) displays the traditional negative relationship 
between the parental level of human capital and the choice of fertility. 
  Proceed now to the major point of this paper – the effect of free public schooling 
on parental fertility decisions and on the children’s human capital stock.  
  From (9), it is immediately clear that a possibility to send children to free public 
school increases the threshold level under which parents choose to invest only in the 
quantity of their offspring, so that  
      , ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ




1 = h  is the threshold level in the absence of free public schooling. 
  The effect of free public schooling that saves parental resources, that would 
otherwise be spent to finance private education, on fertility is intuitively clear. Eq. (14) 
demonstrates that the availability of free public schooling entices parents with human 
capital above the threshold  1 ˆ h  to increase the number of children. Moreover, the effect is 
stronger the lower is the parental human capital level. In contrast, the number of children 
born to the parents with human capital below the threshold  , ˆ
1 h  who for any µ  invest 
nothing in the education of their offspring, remains unchanged, as shown in (11). 
   The effect of free public schooling on children’s human capital stock depends on 
the parental human capital level according to the following three cases:   10
 1.  Parental human capital level is below  . ˆ
1 h  In this case, regardless of the availability of 
free public schooling, parents choose not to invest in their offspring’s education. In such a 
situation, for any positive  , µ  their children get 
γ µ) 1 ( +  units of society’s per capita 
human capital stock, as compared to only one unit of  t h  for  . 0 = µ   
 2.  Parental human capital level is above  . ˆ
3 h  In this case, because parents derive utility 
from both, quality and quantity of their offspring, quite intuitively, public educational 
investments entice parents to reduce their own expenditure on the education of their 
children, so as to increase their family size. More importantly, as follows from the 
diminishing returns to scale in educational investments, the substitution effect is strong 
enough to induce parents to reduce their private educational investments per each child 
more than proportionally (Eq. (12)). As a consequence, for the offspring of parents with 
human capital levels above  , ˆ
3 h  for any  , 0 > µ  the resulting per-child human capital is 
lower than it would be in the absence of free public education (Eq. (13)). It can be also 
seen that the negative effect is stronger the lower is the parental human capital level.  
 3.  Parental human capital level is above , ˆ
1 h  but below  . ˆ
3 h  In this case, the output is 
uncertain for the following reason. On the one hand, for any  , 0 > µ  for the parents with 
human capital between these two thresholds  , ˆ ˆ
3 1 h h h t ≤ <  it is optimal to completely 
abstain from private educational investments and to invest only in the quantity of their 
children. On the other hand, their children acquire education in public school. To decide 
whether children gain or loose, one should compare the number of efficiency units of 
labor they acquire in public school and the alternative number of units of efficiency they 
would acquire in private school in the absence of free public education. Comparing (10) 
for  0 > µ  and (13) for  , 0 = µ  one can immediately compute the following threshold 
level: 
      .
) 1 ( 1 ˆ
2 αγδ
γ µ − +
= h                       ( 1 6 )  
For a given positive  , µ  this threshold determines precisely the qualitative nature of the 
effect of free public schooling on the children’s per-capita human capital stock. Children, 
whose parents are characterized by skill levels below  , ˆ
2 h  acquire more human capital in   11
free public school. In contrast, children, whose parents are characterized by skill levels 
above , ˆ
2 h  would acquire more human capital in private school.  
  The following proposition summarizes the main result of this section concerning 
the effect of free public schooling (as captured by a given parameter µ ) on fertility and 
children’s human capital. 
 
 Proposition 1:  The availability of free public schooling  
(1)  Increases fertility for parents with human capital levels above  .
1 ˆ
1 αγδ
= h  
 Proof.  Eq. (14). 
 
 (2)  Increases skill levels for the offspring of parents with human capital below 
,
) 1 ( 1 ˆ
2 αγδ
γ µ − +
= h  and decreases skill levels for the offspring of parents with human 
capital above  . ˆ
2 h 
 Proof.  Compare (10) for  0 > µ  and (13) for  . 0 = µ  
 
  The current formulation also helps us to better understand the effect of free 
schooling on income inequality in the society at different stages of economic 
development. As can be immediately observed, on the one hand, free public schooling 
associated with the parameter µ  decreases the inter-group inequality between the 
offspring of relatively skilled parents with human capital levels above  2 ˆ h  and the 
offspring of relatively unskilled parents with human capital below  . ˆ
2 h  On the other hand, 
it increases inequality within the group of the offspring of the skilled. As a consequence, 
at early stages of development, when the majority of parents are characterized by human 
capital below  , ˆ
2 h  free schooling decrease the overall inequality in society. This result is 
consistent with common views expressed in the existing literature that abstracts from 
parental fertility decisions (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 
1993; Eckstein and Zilcha, 1994; Barham et al, 1995; Viaene and Zilcha, 2005). In 
contrast, at more advanced stages of development, when we take the endogenous fertility 
into consideration, the effect of free public education on equality is reversed. Once   12
parental human capital levels overtake above  , ˆ
2 h  the availability of free public schooling 
discourages private educational investments of parents with lower human capital levels 
more strongly and then negatively affects equality. 
Consider now a possible effect of an exogenous change in the parameter α  
associated with the efficiency of private educational investments. As opposite to the effect 
of , µ  an increase in α  brings about a decrease in the threshold levels, leads to lower 
fertility, higher educational investments and, hence, higher children’s per-capita human 
capital stock for parents mixing quantity and quality. However, while parents above the 
threshold  1 ˆ h  further substitute away from quantity and toward quality, improvements in 
the learning technology associated with an increase in α  do not affect fertility and human 
capital investment decisions of parents who still are below  , ˆ
1 h  who invest only in 
quantity. In addition, an improvement in the efficiency of private education associated 
with  α  decreases inequality within the skilled segment of society, but increases 
inequality between the groups.  
 
2.5.  The Dynamical System 
 
This section analyzes the time path of individual and average human capital levels in the 
economy and examines the results of public policy interventions in the production of 
human capital at different stages of economic development. 
  Consider first a less developed economy, in which, in the absence of free public 
schooling ( 0 = µ ), the society’s average human capital level is below the threshold level 
, ˆ
1 h  but there exist some parents with human capital above that threshold. 
To start with, period  1 + t  average human capital is defined as 
      . ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 ∫ ∫ ∫ + + + + + + = ≡ h dF N h dF h N h F h h t t t t t t t t                                                   (17) 
Distinguishing period t parents with respect to their human capital levels,   13
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) ( ) (
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t                                                            (18) 
Given the number of children and the levels of human capital investment of the two types 
of agents determined in Section 2.4, the average human capital level in period  1 + t  is 
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By construction of this model, Eq. (19) implies non-decreasing per capita human capital 
levels over time, since children, whose parents invest nothing in their education, when 
they become adults, get at least the per-capita human capital of the previous period. The 
economy’s average human capital, however, may not be strictly increasing. 
  Stemming from the global externality in the production of human capital, as 
captured by the properties of (8) with respect to  , t h  basing on the relative number and 
skill levels of parents with human capital above  , ˆ
1 h  this economy evolves along one of 
the following two cases. 
 1.  If the initial fraction of skilled parents with human capital above  1 ˆ h  and their skill 
levels are high enough, the economy evolves along a path of strictly increasing human 
capital levels, so that for all  , 0 > j   . t j t h h > +  In this case, the society’s average human   14
capital level ultimately becomes high enough to overtake the threshold  1 ˆ h .
15 From this 
point on, the economy evolves along a growth path with all agents making strictly 
positive investments in their offspring’s human capital at the expense of reduction in 
quantity. Henceforth, such an economy converges toward identical agents whose fertility 
decreases and human capital increases over time. 
2.  If the initial fraction of the skilled and their human capital levels are not high enough, 
the positive contribution of the skilled parents, who educate their children, to the society’s 
average human capital may be diluted by the growing number of the unskilled. In this 
case, stemming from the global externality in the human capital production function, skill 
levels within skilled dynasties start to decline. All parents in the society ultimately 
converge towards the identical agents with human capital below  1 ˆ h  and the society’s 
average human capital stops to increase. In this instance, the economy is locked in a low-
equilibrium poverty trap at a constant per capita human capital  . ˆ
1 h h <  
  If the economy is in Case 2, the only possibility to pull it out of a poverty trap may 
be to provide a free access to education.
16 If the economy is in Case 1, a necessary and 
sufficient condition for free education to stimulate growth is established in Appendix 
(A1). 
  Consider now a more developed economy, in which the society’s average human 
capital level is above  . ˆ
1 h  In this case, as shown in Section 2.4, a disincentive effect of free 
education for parents with human capital levels above the threshold  2 ˆ h  may dominate its 
                                                  
15  How many periods it takes to get to the overtaking point is difficult to determine precisely. However, a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the economy’s average human capital level to rise above the threshold 
in period  1 + ′ t  is established below.  










































































































δ    
16 Although an increase in the productivity of private educational investments may also help, if the society’s 
average human capital is low enough, a necessary increase in  , α  so as to decrease the threshold level  1 ˆ h  
sufficiently, may be too difficult to achieve.   15
positive effect to increase skills of the offspring of parents with human capital below  . ˆ
2 h  
However, for any given  , µ  a necessary and sufficient condition for free education to 
increase the society’s average human capital level, relative to the case, when free 
education is not available, is established below. 
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Once this inequality is reversed, a decrease in public spending on free education, 
associated with the parameter  , µ  may increase the society’s average human capital. From 
this point on, in order to enhance human capital accumulation, an appropriate public 
education policy should concentrate on improvements in the productivity of private 
educational investments, as modeled here by an increase in the parameter  . α
17  
 
 3.  Conclusion 
                                                  
17 An increase in the rate of return on human capital as a useful instrument to raise the level of education has 
been recommended, e.g., by Foster and Rosenzweig (1996, 2002).   16
This article analyzes the effect of free public education on fertility, private educational 
investments and human capital accumulation at different stages of economic 
development. It uses a growth model to show that, when fertility is endogenous, parental 
human capital levels are crucial for implications of free education. At early stages of 
development, if parental human capital levels are low, free access to basic education may 
provide the only chance to leave poverty. In contrast, at advanced stages of development, 
if parental human capital is high, the availability of free public education crowds out 
private educational investments, increases fertility and may be detrimental for growth. 
The analysis suggests that, once the necessarily high level of society's human capital is 
achieved, in order ot enhance human capital accumulation, an appropriate public 
education policy should substitute away from free public education regime and 
concentrate on improvements in the productivity of private educational investments. 
 
Appendix 
A necessary and sufficient condition for free education  ) 0 ( > µ  to increase the society’s 
average human capital level in the case of a less developed economy, in which the 
society’s average human capital level is below the threshold level  , ˆ
1 h  but there exist some 
parents with human capital above that threshold is 
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